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Abstract. During the last decade, scheduling the healthcare services
(such as staffs and OTs) inside the hospitals have assumed a central
role in healthcare. Recently, some works are addressed in the direction of
hiring the expert consultants (mainly doctors) for the critical health-
care scenarios from outside of the medical unit, in both strategic
and non-strategic settings under monetary and non-monetary
perspectives. In this paper, we have tried to investigate the experts
hiring problem with multiple patients and multiple experts; where
each patient reports a preferred set of experts which is private infor-
mation alongwith their private cost for consultancy. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first step in the direction of modelling the ex-
perts hiring problem in the combinatorial domain. In this paper,
the combinatorial auction based scheme is proposed for hiring experts
from outside of the hospitals to have expertise by the preferred doctors
set to the patients.
1 Introduction
The scarcity of well qualified healthcare experts such as physicians, sur-
geons, nurses etc, during the critical healthcare scenario inside the hospitals
(or medical units) has been highlighted as one of the biggest obstacles in achiev-
ing the high quality medical services. In our future references healthcare experts
will be used as experts. Also medical units, hospitals, and organizations will
be used interchangeably. As the experts are scarce, the immediate questions
that comes in the mind is: how to efficiently and effectively schedule the experts
and services of the medical units so as to meet their demand upto some extent?
Answering to the above raised question, the substantial number of works have
been done in literature to schedule the healthcare services mainly physicians
[17], nurses [1], and Operation theatres (OTs) [8][4] inside the hospi-
tals. Today with the advancement in technologies, more precisely advancement
in medical technologies, the experts can provide their expertise to the patients
admitted miles away from the experts resident with their physical or virtual pres-
ence. It is to be noted that, the virtual presence of the experts can be achieved by
utilizing several communication medias say video conferencing, smart-
phone etc. In recent years, several works have been initiated in the direction
2of hiring expertise from outside of the in-house hospitals for the patients, under
both monetary [15][12] and non-monetary environment [11][13].
In this paper, we have tried to investigate the more general setup in the
expert hiring problem in healthcare domain with multiple patients and
multiple experts. In this set-up, each patient reveals a preferred set of experts
and the private cost for consultancy that is meant as the consultation fees of the
experts, if allocated. Our goal is to allocate the requested set of experts to the
patients in a conflict-free way with the constraint of maximizing the total
cost for consultancy, in literature it is termed as social welfare.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elucidates the
preliminary concepts about scheduling of healthcare services inside the hospitals
and scheduling of doctors outside of the hospitals. Section 3 describes our pro-
posed model. The proposed mechanisms is illustrated in section 4. The paper is
concluded with the possible future directions in section 5.
2 Literature review
The prior art on scheduling the hospital resources such as operation the-
atres (OTs), physicians, nurses etc.) can be classified into two broad
categories− one addressing the scenario of scheduling the hospital resources
inside the in-house hospitals, with the other addressing scheduling of experts
outside the in-house hospitals. Our paper can be classified more in the second
category. While there are many fundamental questions that lie at the core of this
area, our work finds relevance to only few of them such as a) Which experts are
to be hired? b) How to fulfil the multiple demand of the patients for the experts
in a conflict-free way? c) What is to be paid to the hired experts?
A vast majority of the literature in scheduling the hospital resources is dedi-
cated to the problem of scheduling the hospital resources inside the in-house hos-
pitals. A wide variety of scheduling techniques have been proposed to scheduling
OTs [6][8][4][2][5][7], internal staffs (such as nurses [1], physicians [17] etc.) in-
side the hospital.
The study of hiring experts, as considered here, was initiated by [15] in non-
strategic setting and by [12] in strategic setting. Talking about the works done
in non-strategic setting, in [15] a doctor is providing his expertise to a patient
admitted to distant hospital by its virtual presence by utilizing the communica-
tion media such as video conferencing. In [16] the context of the patients
(such as age, sex, medical report etc.) and the context of doctors (such as ex-
pertise area) are utilized to recommend the doctors from outside the admitted
hospitals to the patients. Now moving to the setting where the patients and
doctors (collectively called agents) are strategic in nature. In [12] the set
of doctors are hired from outside of the hospital for a patient admitted to a
hospital. To allocate the doctors to a patient an auction based framework is
utilized. Extending the work done in [12], in [14] the more realistic situation of
hiring the doctors from outside the hospitals is considered where the patient is
constrained by budget. One interesting situation is addressed in [11] that tackles
3the situation of hiring of socially motivated doctors who are intended to provide
free of cost services. In [11] the mechanisms are developed to allocate a doctor
to a patient. Following [11], in [13] an effort has been made to model the ECs
hiring problem as a two sided preference market in healthcare domain.
Finally, our work is related to and build upon the concept of combinatorial
auction, studied in the field of algorithmic mechanism design [3][10]. Our setting
is different from the above addressed set-ups due to the reason that there are
multiple patients and multiple experts alongwith the constraint that the patients
request for the doctors set is combinatorial in nature. By combinatorial na-
ture, we mean that the patients can place their interest on the combination of
experts, rather than individual expert. We have designed a combinatorial auction
based scheme motivated by [3][9] for the discussed set-up.
3 System model and problem formulation
Let P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} be the set of all patients and S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm} the
set of all experts. If not specified explicitly, n and m denote the total number
of patients and the total number of experts respectively. For the time being,
we assume that the expertise level (or quality) of all the experts are similar.
Each patient’s valuation is the cost he/she (henceforth he) is willing to pay
for the consultancy received from the preferred set of experts. The valuation
vector of the patient set is given as v = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}; where vi ∈ ℜ+ is
the valuation of patient pi if he gets the specified set of experts otherwise 0.
Each of the patients place their private valuation in sealed bid manner. It is
to be noted that due to strategic nature of the patients, they can mis-report
their respective private values. So, it is convenient to represent the bid value
reported by patient pi for receiving the consultancy as v
′
i. v
′
i = vi describes
the fact that any patient pi is not deviating from its true valuation. On the
other hand, the true demand vector of all the available patients is given as
D˜ = {D˜1, D˜2, . . . , D˜n}; where D˜i ∈ D˜ is the preferred doctor set of the patient
pi. It is convenient to represent the reported demand of experts by any patient
pi as D˜′i. D˜′i = D˜i ensure the fact that the demand of expert set reported by
patient i is true. The two tuples, in combination, will be termed as the type of
the patients. The type profile of all the patients is given as π = {π1, π2, . . . , πn};
where πi = < D˜i, vi >. π′i = πi ensure the fact that the type profile reported
by patient i is true. The type of all the patients except i can be represented as
π−i = {π1, π2, . . . , πi−1, πi+1, . . . , πn}. Let A be the set of all possible allocation
of m experts to n patients. More formally, a mechanism M = (f, p˜i) consists
of an allocation mechanism f : π¯n → A and the payment functions p˜i : π¯n → ℜ
for i = 1, . . . , n. The mechanism M is said to be computationally efficient if f
and p˜i can be determined in poly-time. As the patients are individually rational,
they will try to maximize their utility. The utility function for ith patient is ui
and is given as ui : A × πi → ℜ. The utility of any patient can be defined as
the true valuation minus the payment that is to be paid by him if the preferred
4doctor set is allocated. More formally, the utility of the ith patient is given as:
ui(f(vi, v−i), vi) =
{
vi(t)− p˜i(vi, v−i), if t = D˜i
0, Otherwise
(1)
where, t = f(vi, v−i) and p˜i(vi, v−i) is the payment made by the patient i if
patient i gets the set of preferred experts. Considering the above discussed set-
up so far, our goal is to determine the set of patients Q ⊆ P to whom their
preferred doctor set are allocated such that for every i 6= j ∈ Q, D˜i ∩ D˜j = φ
maximizes the social welfare given as
∑
i∈Q vi.
Definition 1 (Incentive Compatibility). A mechanism M(f, p˜1, . . . , p˜n) is
called incentive compatible if for every patient i, and every π1, . . . , πn, π
′
i ∈ π,
we have that vi(t) − p˜i(vi, v−i) ≥ vi(t′) − p˜i(v′i, v−i), where t = f(vi, v−i), t′ =
f(v′i, v−i).
Definition 2 (monotonicity). Fix π−i, a patient who were allocated an expert
set by reporting the type πi =< D˜i, vi > will be allocated the expert set for any
other type π′i =< D˜′i, v′i > such that v′i > vi and for any D˜′i ⊂ Di.
4 Truthful Greedy Mechanism for Hiring Experts
In this section, we propose an approximately efficient and truthful greedy mech-
anism motivated by [3][9] for the experts hiring problem. The proposed
mechanism consists of an allocation rule and payment rule, those when tide up
leads to an incentive compatible mechanism.
Allocation rule In the Allocation rule, firstly each of the patients are placed
at the suitable position in the decreasing ordering of the patients based on the
criteria vi√
|D˜i|
such that v1√
|D˜1|
≥ v2√
|D˜2|
≥ . . . ≥ vn√
|D˜n|
. Once sorting is done, the
next step is, in each iteration the allocation mechanism greedily selects a patient
pi that satisfies the condition that the set of preferred experts by pi say D˜i and
the set of preferred experts by the patients in partially determined winning set
Q i.e. ∪k∈QD˜k shares no common experts i.e. D˜i ∩ (∪k∈QD˜k) = φ. Finally, the
allocation rule terminates once all the patients in set P is accessed.
Payment rule Once the winning set of patients i.e. Q is determined, next goal
is to decide the amount they will pay against the consultancy by the preferred
experts. In the payment rule, for determining the payment of each patient pi ∈ Q
first the smallest index j in the sorted ordering is determined such that D˜i∩D˜j 6=
φ, and also for all index ℓ < j except index i, D˜ℓ ∩ D˜j = φ. Once the index j
is determined the payment of any patient pi ∈ Q is given as vj√
|D˜j|/|D˜i|
. In the
5similar fashion, the payment of the remaining patients in the winning set Q will
be determined.
Algorithm 1: Truthful Greedy Mechanism for Hiring Experts
Input : P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}
Input : π = {π1, π2, . . . , πn}
Output: Q ← φ, p˜← φ
/* Allocation mechanism */
1 Sort descend(P) // Sorting in descending order of vi√
|D˜i|
∀pi ∈ P
2 for i = 1 to n do
3 if D˜i ∩ ( ∪
j∈Q
D˜j) = φ then
4 Q ← Q∪ pi
5 end
6 end
/* Payment rule */
7 foreach pi ∈ Q do
8 j∗ ← argminj {D˜i ∩ D˜j 6= φ}; ∀j > i
9 if such j exists then
10 p˜i ← vj∗√
|D˜j∗ |/|D˜i|
11 p˜← p˜ ∪ p˜i
12 end
13 else
14 p˜i ← 0
15 p˜← p˜ ∪ p˜i
16 end
17 end
18 return Q, p˜
4.1 Analysis of Algorithm 1
Proposition 1. The proposed mechanism is incentive compatible [3].
Theorem 1. The running time of the proposed mechanism (Algorithm 1) is
O(n2).
Proof. The running time can be derived in a straight forward way. The sorting in
line 1 will take O(n lg n) time. For each iteration of for loop line 2-6 is bounded
above by O(1). As the for loop will iterate for n times, so line 2-6 will take O(n)
time. For each iteration of for loop, line 8 is bounded above by O(n) and line
9-16 will take O(1) time. As the for loop will iterate for n times in worst case.
So, line 7-16 is bounded above by O(n2). Thus, the running time of the proposed
algorithm is bounded above by O(n lg n) +O(n) +O(n2)= O(n2). ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. Any patient pi ∈ P can’t gain by misreporting his true valuation.
6Proof. In the similar line in [3] the more detailed proof in our setting is presented.
For any patient i the type information can be mis-reported by misreporting the
valuation π′i =< D˜i, v′i >. So, this gives rise to two different cases:
Case 1. Let us suppose that the ith winning patient deviates and reports a type
π′i 6= πi such that the valuation v′i > vi. As the patient was winning with vi, with
v′i he would continue to win and his utility ui(f(v
′
i, v−i), v
′
i) = ui(f(vi, v−i), vi).
If instead he reports v′i < vi. Again two cases can happen. He can still win.
If he wins his utility, according to the definition will be ui(f(v
′
i, v−i), v
′
i) =
ui(f(vi, v−i), vi). If loses his utility will be ui(f(v
′
i, v−i), v
′
i) = 0< ui(f(vi, v−i), vi).
Case 2. If the ith patient was losing with vi let us see whether he would gain by
deviation. If he reports v′i < vi, he would still lose and his utility ui(f(v
′
i, v−i), v
′
i) =
0 = ui(f(vi, v−i), vi). If instead he reports v
′
i > vi. Two cases can occur. If he
still loses his utility ui(f(v
′
i, v−i), v
′
i) = 0 = ui(f(vi, v−i), vi). But if he wins,
then he had to beat some valuation vj such that
v′i√
D˜i
≥ vj√
D˜j
. Now as he wins
his utility ui(f(v
′
i, v−i), v
′
i) < 0 in this case. So he would have got a negative
utility. Hence no gain is achieved.
This concludes the proof. Considering the case 1 and case 2 above, it can be
concluded that any patient i can’t gain by mis-reporting his valuation. ⊓⊔
5 Conclusion and future works
In this paper, we have addressed the more general setup in the healthcare system
with multiple patients and multiple experts; where each patients has a privilege
to report the required set of experts alongwith their private valuations. We have
proposed, a combinatorial auction based scheme for this problem that results
in an allocation which is no better than
√
m-approximation of the optimal al-
location. Designing the more general mechanism for the set-up consisting of n
patients and m experts with experts varying in quality can be thought of as our
immediate future work.
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